The State of Utah v. Max L. Smith : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
The State of Utah v. Max L. Smith : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; James H. Beadles; Assistant Attorney General; Counsel for
Appellee.
Margaret Lindsay; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin; Counsel for Max L. Smith.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation






IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPALS 
POCKET NO C\ <5 Oil <Ti 





Case No. 950715-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, FROM A CONVICTION OF DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 41-6-44, 
THE HONORABLE GUY R. BURNINGHAM PRESIDING 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lalke City, Utah 84114 
Counsel for Appellee 
MARGARET LINDSAY (6766) 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-4912 
Counsel for Max L. Smith FILED 
JUN - 2 199? 
COURT OF APPEALS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT 
ALLOWING A BIFIJRCATED PROCEEDING 1 
A. Utah • requires bifurcation 2 
1. State v. Doporto holds that prior conviction evidence is highly 
prejudicial 2 
2. Bifurcation is necessary when prior convictions "beai :)n tl le 
sentence to be imposed." 4 
C. The trial court committed reversible error because the nature of the 
crime to be proved was the same as the prior convictions 6 
In a similar case to the one at bar, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
found that reversible error when the jury heard prior conviction 
evidence during the guilt phase 7 
1. The trial judge did not give the jury any cautionary 
instructions to counterbalance the prejudicial effect of the 
prior crime evidence 8 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 9 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
State v. Alexander, 559 N.W.2d 925 (Wis. App. 1996) 8 
State v. Doporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1997) 1-4, 6, 8, 9 
State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989) 2 
State v. Saul, 434 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1989) 7 
State v. Stewart, 171 P.2d 383 (Utah 1946) 1, 2, 8 
Statutory Provisions 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence 3 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evudebce 3 
i i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MAX L. SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 950715-CA 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT 
ALLOWING A BIFURCATED PROCEEDING 
While conceding that the court erred in refusing to bifurcate the trial, the State 
asserts that this mistake was harmless error. The State is correct that the trial court erred 
in allowing the jury to hear of Max Smith's previous convictions before determining his 
guilt or innocence as to the fourth and present charge. However, in light of State v. 
Stewart. 171 P.2d 383 (Utah 1946), and, most recently, State v. Doporto. 308 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 18 (Utah 1997), it is clear that the court committed reversible error by failing to 
bifurcate the trial. 
A. Utah case law requires bifurcation. 
In State v. Stewart, the Utah Supreme Court found that bifurcation was necessary 
in DUI cases which called for a harsher punishment if convicted because of prior DUI 
offenses The Court adopted this procedure "in view of the prejudicial nature of the 
evidence of prior conviction as such evidence bears on proof of commission of 
substantive offense. Stewart. 171 P.2d at 386. The Court held that since "the prior 
convictions could not properly be considered by the jury in determining the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant of the substantive offense," it was "reversible error to permit 
evidence thereof to be presented to the jury in the trial of that issue." Id. Furthermore, 
Utah courts, including the most recent decision, State v. Doporto. have repeatedly 
affirmed that "evidence of prior crimes is generally presumed prejudicial and that 'absent 
a reason for the admission of the evidence other than to show criminal disposition, the 
evidence is excluded.'" State v. James. 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 1989). 
1. State v, Doporto holds that prior conviction evidence is highly 
prejudicial. 
In State v. Doporto. the Utah Supreme Court reversed the defendants conviction 
and remanded for a new trial because the trial court had admitted prior crime evidence 
which did not have any "probative value beyond the prohibited inference that he had 
some propensity to commit such crimes and acted in accordance with that propensity." 
Id at 20. 
2 
In rendering its decision, the Court determined that due to the "acute concerns of 
fundamental fairness arising from the real possibility that the defendant will be convicted 
for his presumed bad character rather than his acts" when prior crime evidence is 
admitted, appellate courts in Utah should "review closely the trial court's justifications 
when it chooses to admit evidence under 404(b)". IdL at 14. 
Moreover, the Court set forth a three-prong test relating to the admissibility or 
prior crime evidence: 
To assure the integrity of the trial process, we hold that evidence of prior crimes is 
presumed to be inadmissible and that, prior to admitting it, the trial court must find 
that (1) there is a necessity for the prior crime evidence, (2) it is highly probative 
of a material issue of the crime charged, and (3) its special probativeness and the 
necessity for it outweigh its prejudicial effect. As stated above, we will review the 
trial court's rulings on these issues more closely than ordinary rulings on relevance 
and with a limited deference." 
Id at 16. 
Although Rule 402 provides that any evidence that is relevant may be admissible, 
Rule 404(b) clearly prohibits the use of prior crime evidence to "prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith." kL at 18. The evidence may be 
used for other purposes outlined in Rule 404(b). However, "even if relevant to prove 
such issues, the prior crime evidence must meet certain standards. First, it must be 
necessary; it cannot be used to prove a point not really contested. Second, it must be 
strongly probative of a material issue, a probativeness that cannot serve as a ruse for 
showing that the defendant's propensity is such that he is likely to have committed the 
kind of crime charged." Id at 19 (emphasis added). 
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2. Bifurcation is necessary when prior convictions "bear on the sentence to 
be imposed." 
The Doporto court describes two situations in which prior crime evidence may be 
admissible. "First, the commission of prior crimes may, itself, constitute an element of 
the crime charged or bear on the sentence to be imposed . . . . Second, evidence of prior 
crimes may be adduced as circumstantial evidence of a material element of the crime 
charged. The highly prejudicial effect of prior crime evidence has been recognized in 
both instances and dealt with in different way." Id. at 8. 
In referring to the type of prior crime evidence at issue in this case, the Court 
explained: 
The first category of prior crime evidence is admissible because the commission of 
a prior crime or crimes is an aggravating factor constituting an element of the 
crime charged and must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt for the 
prosecution to prove all the elements of that enhanced charge. We have held that 
prior crime evidence must not be allowed to prejudice the finder of fact in deciding 
the issue of guilt on the underlying charge. To that end, we have required that the 
prior crime evidence be presented in a separate bifurcated proceeding, after the 
proceeding where guilt is decided on the underlying charge." 
hi at 8, 9. 
In the present case, Smith and the State stipulated to the three prior convictions, 
rendering it unnecessary for the prosecution to prove this element beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Unfortunately, the judge refused to accept the motion. He explained: "I tried that 
once in another county and found that it was quite burdensome and confusing to the jury" 
(R. 148) Further, he stated to the defense attorney that "I think you can take away any 
prejudicial effect if you just instruct the jury that that's one [element] they don't even 
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need to worry about but attack on the ones that you do intend to attack in court today" 
(R. 149). 
However, even if Smith had not stipulated to the three convictions, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Doporto has made it clear that the prior conviction element of felony 
DUI must be proved in a separate proceeding after the jury had made a determination on 
the present charge. The trial court committed error by allowing the prosecution to discuss 
the previous convictions in the guilt phase. In his opening statement, the prosecuting 
attorney referred to the prior convictions: uIn addition, as you've heard previously, the 
defendant is charged with a felony. A felony occurs in Utah when a person has three 
prior convictions for DUI after April 23rd of 1990. Counsel agrees with me that that has 
occurred. So you can take that as a given." (R. 168-69) At the close of the prosecution's 
case-in-chief, the attorney again referred to the prior convictions. (Id. 258) Finally, in 
his closing argument, he stated again "that he (Smith) has the three prior convictions. 
Well, we've stipulated to that" (R. 327). 
By requiring the inclusion of the prejudicial prior conviction evidence during the 
guilt phase, the trial court erroneously allowed the jury's verdict to be tainted by evidence 
which the jury should not have heard until Smith's guilt or innocence on the present 
charge had been determined. 
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C. The trial court committed reversible error because the nature of the crime to 
be proved was the same as the prior convictions. 
In Doporto. the Utah Supreme Court also reviewed whether the erroneous 
admission of prior crime evidence constituted reversible error. Doporto. 308 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 27, 28. The Court reiterated the "harmless error" standard: "A conviction will 
not be reversed even if there is error unless the error is 'prejudicial in the sense that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a more favorable 
result for the defendant."5 id at 28 (citing State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 1071, 1073). 
However, the Court concluded that the trial court committed reversible error 
because the Court was "wholly unable to conclude that the jury was uninfluenced by that 
[prior crime] evidence in assessing defendant's and the victim's credibility. We cannot 
say with any assurance that absent the erroneous admission of the evidence of the prior 
crime evidence, the result would have been the same [in convicting the defendant]." kL 
at 29. 
Because of the presumed highly prejudicial nature of admitting Smith's three 
previous convictions in the guilt phase, it seems unlikely that the jury was "uninfluenced" 
by the prior DUI convictions in its assessment of Smith and his credibility.. Smith's 
explanation of the facts never had a chance because of the jury's likely belief relating to 
Smith's predisposition of guilt which was spawned by the evidence of the three previous 
DUI charges. In accordance with Doporto. it is clear that the trial court committed 
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reversible error in allowing the jury to learn of Smith's prior convictions during the trial's 
guilt phase. 
D. In a similar case to the one at bar, the North Dakota Supreme Court found 
that reversible error when the jury heard prior conviction evidence during the 
guilt phase. 
In State v. Saul 434 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1989), the North Dakota Supreme Court 
found that since "the defendant stipulated to prior convictions when charged under the 
enhancement provisions of [North Dakota's DUI statute], the submission of evidence of 
the defendant's prior convictions to a jury constitutes prejudicial and reversible error." Id 
at 573 n. 1, 575. The court explained its holding by recognizing that "the risk is 
considerable that the jury may have improperly used [the defendant's] prior convictions to 
find him guilty of driving while under the influence in this case." Id at 575. The court 
concluded: 
When a defendant stipulates to the prior convictions, as in this case, he effectively 
removes that element of the crime from the charge, and we do not see any reason 
why evidence of the prior convictions should be submitted to the jury unless they 
are relevant to some disputed issue under Rule 404(b). 
Id at 575. 
The court also addressed the role of the cautionary instruction provided by the trial 
court, finding that it may be appropriate to counterbalance the prejudicial effects of the 
prior conviction evidence when the prior convictions were contested. However, the court 
found "no purpose in risking reliance on the cautionary instruction to alleviate the 
prejudicial effect of the prior convictions when the defendant has stipulated to them." IdL 
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at 573 n. 2, 575. This court's decision reflects the Utah Supreme Court's sensitivity to the 
highly prejudicial nature of prior conviction evidence. 
L The trial judge did not give the jury any cautionary instructions to 
counterbalance the prejudicial effect of the prior crime evidence. 
In the present case, the trial court not only refused the parties' stipulation but he 
also failed to give a cautionary instruction to the jury. Instead the court indicated to 
counsel before closing arguments that "I think we did soft petal (sic) it enough so that I 
don't think it's a big issue with the jury. They realize what their duty is is to tell us 
whether or not on this occasion Mr. Smith was driving under the influence" (R. 348-49). 
Although the trial judge did not want the prosecuting attorney to make "a big deal" 
of Smith's prior convictions, this safeguard made no sense in light of Smith's stipulation 
to the prior convictions (R. 150). Also, this instruction to the attorneys could not take 
the place of a cautionary jury instruction. 
In contrast, in the Wisconsin case, State v. Alexander. 559 N.W.2d 925 (Wis. App. 
1996), relied on by the State in its brief, the trial court used a cautionary instruction to 
counteract the prejudicial effect of admitting the defendant's prior convictions. Id. at 926. 
Such an instruction was not given here. Moreover, even had such a cautionary instruction 
been given by the trial court, in Utah bifurcation would still be required under State v. 
Stewart and State v. Doporto. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the trial court's failure to provide for a bifurcated 
proceeding is reversible error. The evidence against Smith is not so overwhelming that 
this Court, under the heightened standard of review set forth in Doporto. can "wholly" 
conclude that the "jury was uninfluenced" by the prior crime evidence. Smith and his 
witnesses provided a reasonable explanation of the facts, indicating that Smith was not 
driving under the influence of alcohol (R. 264-306, 327-44). Unfortunately, because of 
the trial court's error in refusing to conduct bifurcated proceedings, the jury never had 
the opportunity to properly and fairly assess the credibility of Smith's position because of 
the prejudicial nature of the prior conviction evidence. 
Accordingly, Smith asks this Court to reverse his conviction. 
DATED this Q_ day of June, 1997. 
]Yl*AA>A\d ; ,^~fl^tLa^ 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for MAX L. SMITH !J 
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